On July 23, D301 trains from Beijing to Fuzhou and D3115 trains from Fuzhou to Hangzhou caused rear-end collisions. Caused the D301 train to take off from line 1 to 4, and the D3115 train took off on line 15 and 16. At present, 39 people have been killed and 192 injured. The occurrence of a major accident in this train once again pushed the high-speed railway, which has received much attention from the people from the very beginning, to the cusp of the storm.

Since the opening of the Beijing-Shanghai high-speed railway this year, a nationwide discussion has begun on the high-speed rail from academics, industry experts and the general public. The topics range from the national strategic significance of the opening of the High Speed ​​Rail to the impact of the opening of the high-speed rail on China’s economic development to the impact on the lives of the general public. However, since the opening of the high-speed train, many trains have failed in succession, and the public has therefore questioned the safety of high-speed rails. There are also many arguments from relevant departments and scholars about the cause of train failure. On the one hand, it is said that the high-speed train still needs to run-in, and on the other hand, it indicates that the bad weather of the train caused the train to malfunction.

Until the “7.23 Incident” occurred, the answer given by the Ministry of Railways in answering the cause of the accident appeared to be similar to that of some trains that had previously failed. The accident was also caused by the weather, caused by the loss of power due to a lightning strike on the train. The discussion on the safety of high-speed rail was pushed to a climax.

First, the high-speed rail safety monitoring leads to questioning the accident After many incidents involving security suppliers have occurred, the public has questioned the high-speed rail's safety monitoring system. As a result, suppliers of safety monitoring systems behind the high-speed rail seemingly unrelated to the accident have come to the fore. The suppliers of Brilliant Technologies, Century Realel, Jiaxun Feihong and Territory listed companies were all suspended due to the July 23 accident.

Subsequently, a number of high-speed rail-related listed companies issued a “clarification announcement” and tried to make clear the relationship with the accident. The companies that have issued clarification announcements from the brilliant technology, Century Realel, Jiaxun Feihong and Terrell's 4 security product suppliers all stated that their products used in the Yongwen line are operating normally and have nothing to do with the accident. We have seen from the announcement from the glorious science and technology release that “As of now, the company has not received any notification or request for assistance in investigations related to this accident.” Similar to the glorious science and technology, in the face of the “7.23” accident, Century Rui All three related security monitoring equipment vendors, including Seoul, Jiaxun Feihong, and Trek, said that they have not received the “Assist Investigation Notice or Request”.

Although the occurrence of this high-speed rail accident has nothing to do with the relevant safety monitoring equipment suppliers, it is undeniable that the occurrence of this accident will inevitably cause some losses to some of the security monitoring suppliers.

Second, EMU safety monitoring system failure?

The occurrence of the "7.23" incident is puzzling that the accident was caused by the end of both vehicles. So what kind of security line is laid in the safety process of high-speed trains?

According to Professor Xie Weida of Tongji University, in an interview with the media, there are three lines of defense deployed on the railway lines that run on motor vehicles. The first is the CTCS system, that is, the Chinese train operation control system. The CTCS system is a train operation control system. It can determine the position of all running trains on a line, the relationship between the trains and their operating speed. The trains follow the regulations and can guarantee that all the trains run on one line. The train is orderly and safe. This is also the first line of defense to prevent rear-end trains.

The second is LKJ, which is the train operation monitoring device. This system of train monitoring device was originally not intended for the operation of an EMU. It is a device used on electric locomotives and diesel locomotives in the original system to ensure the safety of train operations. Now that we have a good CTCS system, the LKJ system is not its backup. When the train is running on the main line, with the CTCS system, after the line is down, there is no CTCS system, and the LKJ system is used.

The last line of defense is that the third line of defense is manual scheduling. If the train operation fails, the CTCS system will reflect the situation to the dispatch room. The dispatch room should immediately know that the train has stopped. At this time, the dispatch room will release the news that the train is stopped.

However, even with these three security lines escorting the EMU, it is still not safe to ensure the safety of train operations. EMU trains are usually driven by automatic blocking method. Because they are divided into blocks, they can be tracked with the minimum running time interval. A continuous track circuit is installed in the entire section to automatically check the track's integrity, but it still has a fixed space. Interval (occluded partitions) to ensure train safety. This situation does not usually occur after the rear-end. However, if there is a problem with the schedule, the command is not sent to the car, or if it does not slow down after a crash, or if there is no instruction from the ground, it will cause a rear-end collision. In the accident, the two trains were a static and a dynamic cause of rear-end collision. It also showed that the rear-end collision prevention system completely lost its due role in the accident.

Third, high-speed rail can learn from the implementation of the highway to detect the state of the vehicle After the high-speed rail accident occurred, why the railway sector did not detect the vehicle has been parked on the rail Many people have raised a question, whether the high-speed rail is equipped with GPS or satellite positioning system? In response to this problem, HC Security Network interviewed the National Intelligent Transportation Systems Engineering Technology Research Center doctoral, system integration project manager, security system integration, electronic payment expert Liu Jie. In this regard, Liu Jie said that there is no GPS or satellite positioning system on the high-speed rail is not very aware of this. According to common sense, this high-tech, modern transportation facility should be equipped with a positioning system. If there is no GPS or satellite positioning system on the high-speed rail, this is a big security risk for high-speed rails.

According to online commentary and professional analysis, in the accident, the dispatch system did not detect the presence of a vehicle stop. There may be two reasons. First, when the vehicle is in a running state, the GPS cannot track the signal because the speed of the train is too fast. Second, even after the train stops, the high-speed rail is in a tight closed state, which affects the transmission of signals.

So far, as to why the train in front of the train suddenly stopped, why the train that came from behind failed to get news in a timely manner, and the reason for this was unknown to us. In an interview with Liu Jie by the HC Security Network, he proposed a measure currently being implemented on the highway that the high-speed rail operation department can learn from.

Liu Jie said that many domestic provinces and cities have begun to implement the vehicle status test on passenger cars. The vehicle state detection is to install some parameter sensors on the vehicle, and it can collect a driving state of the whole vehicle at any time. When some parts of the vehicle have problems, the sensor will send a signal, and the dispatcher can timely inform the driver that the vehicle has a fault, so as to ensure the safety of the vehicle and passengers as much as possible. At the same time, Liu Jie also stated that this project is still in trial implementation, and it cannot be achieved in the short term. Regarding the issue of whether this item proposed by the author can be used on a high-speed rail, Liu Jie said that the high-speed rail should have its own set of monitoring systems, but the high-speed rail for the vehicle status detection project can also be used for reference. The difficulty is not great. The key is whether or not there is this conscious issue. Liu Jie said that if the vehicle condition detection can really be applied to high-speed rails, the relevant department can identify the cause of the accident in a timely manner by recording relevant parameters of the vehicle state detection after the accident, and will not find black boxes like the current one. Afterwards, the analysis was conducted so that the information feedback was not timely.

The safety of high-speed rail is related to the safety of millions of people. If there are loopholes in the safety monitoring system during the construction of high-speed rail, it will inevitably cause great safety risks to the operation of high-speed rail. Therefore, it is an important task to build a complete high-speed rail safety monitoring system as soon as possible for people in the country. It is a national event that concerns the national economy and the people's livelihood.